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Abstract—Twitter has increasingly become a popular platform
to share news and user opinion. A tweet is considered to be impor-
tant if it receives high number of affirmative reactions from other
Twitter users via Retweets. Retweet count is thus considered
as a surrogate measure for positive crowd-sourced reactions –
high number of retweets of a tweet not only help the tweet being
broadcasted, but also aid in making its topic trending. This in
turn bolsters the social reputation of the author of the tweet.
Since social reputation/impact of users/tweets influences many
decisions (such as promoting brands, advertisement etc.), several
blackmarket syndicates have actively been engaged in producing
fake retweets in a collusive manner. Users who want to boost the
impact of their tweets approach the blackmarket services, and
gain retweets for their own tweets by retweeting other customers’
tweets. Thus they become customers of blackmarket syndicates
and engage in fake activities. Interestingly, these customers are
neither bots, nor even fake users – they are usually normal human
beings; they express a mix of organic and inorganic retweeting
activities, and there is no synchronicity across their behaviors.
In this paper, we make a first attempt to investigate such
blackmarket customers engaged in producing fake retweets. We
collected and annotated a novel dataset comprising of customers
of many blackmarket services and characterize them using a set
of 64 novel features. We show how their social behavior differs
from genuine users. We then use state-of-the-art supervised
models to detect three types of customers (bots, promotional,
normal) and genuine users. We achieve a Macro F1-score of
0.87 with SVM, outperforming four other baselines significantly.
We further design a browser extension, SCoRe which, given
the link of a tweet, spots its fake retweeters in real-time. We
also collected users’ feedback on the performance of SCoRe and
obtained 85% accuracy.
Index Terms—Retweeters, collusion, blackmarket, Twitter, On-
line Social Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter, arguably the most popular micro-blogging site,
provides its users two major ways to place their affirmative
reactions towards different entities: (i) user-level affirmation
(such as follow), and (ii) content-level affirmation (such as
retweet, like). Here, we particularly focus on ‘retweet-
ing activity’, a major content-level affirmative action, which
provides a way of re-broadcasting messages and confirms
retweeter’s agreement of the message being important to
others. Retweet count of a tweet gives the OSN users a sense
of crowdsourced agreement on the tweet, and thus determines
the influence of the tweet as well as the author of the tweet. It
This paper has got accepted in IEEE/ACM International Conference on
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Fig. 1: (b) Asynchronous behavior of collusive retweeters
as opposed to the (a) synchronicity of normal retweet
fraudsters mentioned in [10]. The figure shows two binned
2-D heatmaps (in logarithmic scale) of Lifespan (time elapsed
between the first and last retweets) vs. Arr-MAD (mean
absolute deviation of retweets inter-arrival times) of retweet
threads for (a) normal retweet fraudsters (data taken from [10])
and (b) collusive retweeters. Unlike (a) where Arr-MAD is
almost invariant with Lifespan, (b) shows an increasing trend.
TABLE I: Macro F1-score of the competing methods.
None of the existing methods can detect collusive retweeters
accurately.
Bot Fake Account Sync. Fake Retweeter Our
Detection [5] Detection [8] Detection [10] Method
0.760 0.693 0.750 0.873
also helps in making a certain topic trending on Twitter. This
further brings an opportunity of ‘intentional manipulation’ to
the social adversaries who falsely create the impression of
popularity of tweets by generating huge volume of retweets.
Challenges in detecting collusive retweeters: There exist
several blackmarket agencies which have created thriving
and intelligent ecosystems of producing spam retweets. Users
can gain retweet count of their own tweets for free by
retweeting tweets of other customers of those services. Thus
users unwillingly become customers of blackmarket services.
Such trend of inflating social reputation has become prevalent
across different social media platforms. Detection of such
blackmarket retweeters is challenging for many reasons – (i)
They are not bots, but human beings; therefore, bot detection
algorithms can not flag them (first column of Table I). (ii)
Their Twitter accounts are not fake; therefore, fake account
detection algorithms can not detect them (second column of
Table I). (iii) They express a mix of organic and inorganic
behavior in their retweeting patterns – they organically reweet
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
08
97
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 23
 Ju
n 2
01
8
some genuine tweets; at the same time, they inorganically
retweet tweets submitted to blackmarket services. The extent
of inorganic activities may differ across retweeters. (iv) They
do not show any synchronicity across their retweeting patterns,
thus making it difficult for the existing synchronous fake
retweeter detection methods [10] to detect them (third column
of Table I).
Motivation and state-of-the-art: Despite previous efforts
in understanding different fraudulent activities in Twitter such
as fake account detection [8], social spam detection [23],
content affirmation via retweeting has hardly been studied.
A preliminarily attempt was made by [10] to detect spam
retweeters with the hypothesis that suspicious activities are
highly ‘synchronized’, i.e., a group of spammers retweet at the
same time. However, we clearly observe that synchronicity
does not hold among collusive retweeters (Figure 1) – this
is intuitive since the blackmarket services do not have control
on the customers involved in producing fraud retweets. A very
recent effort was made by [1] to detect collusive followers
in Twitter. They concluded that crowdsourced manipulation
is a big threat to the credibility of OSNs. However, to the
best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to de-
tect blackmarket-based collusive manipulation of content
credibility via fraudulent retweeting activities. Interestingly,
Twitter has not yet been successful in flagging these customers
– we observed 31 blackmarket customers who are marked as
‘verified users’ by Twitter.
Our Contributions: We begin our experiment by surveying
different types of blackmarket services (Section III-A) and col-
lecting customers from multiple blackmarket services (Section
III-B). We employed human annotators to label each customer
into one of the following categories – bots, promotional and
normal. We also collected genuine users who are researchers /
experts in machine learning, following the method in [18]. The
timeline information of these users (customers and genuine
users) were further scraped. These two sets of users thus
form the retweeter set which we further analyze. We then
propose an exhaustive set of 64 novel features to charac-
terize retweeters (Section IV). We run several state-of-the-
art supervised models to classify retweeters into four types
– bot, promotional customer, normal customer, genuine user.
We observe that Logistic Regression achieves the maximum
accuracy, outperforming the baseline methods significantly
(Section V-C). Our method (with SVM) turns out to be equally
successful in categorizing retweeters into binary classes –
customers and genuine (Macro F1-socre of 0.87).
We finally build a browser extension, SCoRe, ‘Spotting
Collusive Retweers’, which, given a retweeter set of a tweet,
classifies each retweeter as customer or genuine. The extension
allows the end users to judge the quality of the classification
SCoRe produces and provide correct labeling, in case it pro-
duces wrong result. The user-generated feedback is collected
in the back-end and the supervised model is retrained in an
incremental way. However, special care has been taken to ig-
nore spurious feedbacks (more details in Section VI). We seek
feedback of 25 volunteers on the performance of SCoRe and
obtain 85% accuracy. We believe that the widespread use
of such extension would help OSN administrators block the
customers and measure the true credibility of a tweet based
on its genuine retweet count.
Reproducibility: All the codes and processed dataset are
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ruh2o8.
II. RELATED WORK
Detection of fraudsters in OSNs: Many studies have been
conducted on detecting frauds in Twitter and other OSNs.
[2] detected spammers in Twitter using features generated
from tweet content and user social behavior. [15] identified
strangers on Twitter, who can be potential retweeters to help
effectively propagate intended information within a desired
time frame. [11] focused on detecting inorganic retweet behav-
ior and proposed ‘RTGEN’, a realistic generator that imitates
the behaviors of both honest and fraudulent users. [4] used
machine learning approach to classify Twitter accounts into
‘human’, ‘bot’ and ‘cyborg’. [9] discussed the rise of Social
Bots on Twitter. [13] used network properties to identify
spammers on Twitter. [23] proposed a spam detection tech-
nique to identify suspicious users on Twitter. [20] studied
multiple spamming techniques, including creating fake Twitter
accounts, generating spam URLs, and spam distribution. [14]
used synchronous and abnormal behaviors of Twitter followers
to detect suspicious following behavior. [12] detected spam
campaigns on Twitter.
Detection of blackmarket customers in Twitter: Under-
standing the dynamics of blackmarket services have recently
gained substantial attention among researchers. [6] provided
a detailed analysis of blackmarket services and their impact
on multiple OSNs. Most of the prior works showed how
fake followers in social media help in promoting a certain
user [19]. [18] studied multiple types of blackmarket agencies
by showing their multifaceted behavior. [21] studied various
blackmarkets tied to fraudulent Twitter credentials, monitoring
pricing, availability, and fraud perpetrated by these services.
[16] tackled the problem of voluntary following activity de-
tection to automatically detect malicious accounts that make
profit in the follower markets. [17] performed an analysis of
six different underground forums and showed how OSN users
are engaged in selling goods and services.
Remarks. Our methodology differs from the existing ap-
proaches in many ways: (i) [10] identified fake retweeting
behavior in Twitter on the basis of synchronicity. This type of
behavior can only be observed if the retweeters are controlled
by a centralized authority. However, collusive blackmarket
customers are not controlled by anyone. They intentionally
retweet other customers’ tweets. Therefore, they do not ex-
hibit any synchronized behavior. (ii) Existing fraud detection
approaches classify a user into ‘fraud’ or ‘genuine’ [18], [10].
Our work classifies users into four categories – ‘genuine’,
‘bots’, ‘promotional customers’ and ‘normal customers’. (iii)
We are also the first to develop a real-time system that can
identify customers and genuine retweeters, given the retweeter
list of a tweet.
III. BLACKMARKET SERVICES
In this section, we describe our efforts in collecting and
annotating a set of Twitter accounts corresponding to the
customers of various blackmarket agencies.
A. Types of Blackmarket Retweet Services
While investigating the mode of blackmarket services, we
noticed that there are two prevalent models of services [18]
– (i) Premium Services which only provide services upon
receiving payment from the customers; (ii) Freemium Services
which, similar to premium services, offer both paid services,
as well as unpaid services that require the users to provide
their Twitter login details; this in turn may involve the users
unconsciously in the blackmarket activities. Here our primary
focus is to understand the activities of freemium services which
are easy to access due to their unpaid service model. This type
of services can further be divided into three categories:
• Social-share services: These services (e.g., FreeFollow-
ers1) ask customers to perform activities on social-media
contents of other customers involved in those services.
The activities on social-media contents can be ‘Facebook
Share’, ‘Facebook Like’, ‘Twitter Retweets’ etc.
• Credit-based services: These services (e.g., Like4Like,
YouLikeHits, TraffUp, JustRetweet) work on credit-based
policies. Each customer has to put a value for the tweet,
which gets deducted from his/her credits when the tweet
is published. A customer retweets the tweets of other
customers to earn credits and the value of each tweet is
added up to his/her total credit.
• Auto-time retweet services: The customers of these
services (e.g., TweetsTool2) need to get access token
from Twitter and login to the service. They can request
for 10-50 retweets for each of their tweets in a 15-
minute window. Other than the retweet service, it also
provides the customers with the following services –
‘Auto Favourite’, ‘Auto Follower’, ‘Auto Reply’.
B. Data Collection
Collecting blackmarket customers: In order to collect
the information of blackmarket customers, we focused our
crawling only on credit-based services because – (i) their
service policies are easy to understand, (ii) as opposed to
the social-share services, they only utilize a single platform
(Twitter) to perform their activities, (iii) most of the freemium
services follow credit-based strategy compared to the other
strategies which would help us in collecting more data for our
analysis. We adopted an ‘active probing’ strategy to collect
the dataset – we created multiple dummy accounts in each of
the credit-based freemium services (Like4Like, YouLikeHits,
TraffUp, JustRetweet), kept retweeting tweets of other cus-
tomers whose tweets were posted on the blackmarket services,
and collected their IDs. We continued these activities for one
1FreeFollowers: https://www.freefollowers.io/, Like4Like: https://like4like.
org/, TraffUp: http://traffup.net/, JustRetweet: http://justretweet.com.
2http://www.tweetstool.com/
TABLE II: Statistics of the dataset.
Service #users
# users
suspended
/ deleted
# users
taken for
our
analysis
# tweets our
dummy
accounts
retweeted
YouLikeHits 638 168 470 914
Like4Like 451 178 273 459
TraffUp 2 0 2 6
JustRetweet 11 3 8 1
Genuine
Users 1000 0 1000 -
month (Feb, 2018). Table II shows the statistics of the dataset
for each service. During this process, Twitter suspended some
of the accounts we collected, and therefore we ignored those
accounts for further analysis. From the collected dataset, we
noticed that the average number of tweets posted by a user
to YouLikeHits is 1.43 which is relatively high compared to
Like4Like (1.01). Interestingly, we found a significant number
of customer overlap (76 customers) across YouLikeHits and
Like4Like. It suggests that customers utilize several such
blackmarket services audaciously without any obfuscation of
their identities to promote their tweets. We further scraped the
timeline information of these customers using Twitter’s REST
API.
Collecting genuine users: To compare normal users with
blackmarket customers in Twitter, we selected 1000 genuine
users (following [18]) – (i) We searched for Twitter lists
containing users who are researchers, working in the field of
Machine Learning/Data Mining/Information Retrieval. (ii) We
also discarded genuine users who have more than 1 million
followers since high follower count may resemble a celebrity
and we wanted to discard any celebrity-like users from our
analysis in order to remove any unnecessary bias. We further
scraped the timelines of the remaining users.
C. Human Annotation
Three human annotators3 were asked to label the blackmar-
ket customers into Bots, Promotional Customers and Normal
Customers based on our definition of each customer type and
Twitter’s terms of service. Annotators were also given freedom
to search for any information related to customers and apply
their own intuition. Here we describe the information we
provided to the annotators about three types of customers:
1) Bots: A Twitter Bot is a software which controls a Twit-
ter account using the Twitter API [4]. Bots on Twitter
perform both helpful and harmful activities working in
a coordinated fashion [5].
2) Promotional customers: Twitter has always been a
source of advertising content to its target users. Pro-
motional users are involved in promoting one of the
three products: tweets, accounts or services [7]. The
annotators were asked to search for tweets in the time-
line of customers promoting one of the above products.
We observed that many customers in our dataset were
involved in promoting brands using keywords such as
‘win’, ‘ad’, ‘Giveaway’.
3They were experts in social media, and their age ranged between 25-35.
3) Normal customers: These customer do not fall under
any of the two categories mentioned above.
Each annotator was given all the customer accounts for
annotation. Finally, we considered only 743 customers whose
labels were agreed upon by at least two annotators, and
found 86 bots, 275 promotional customers and 382 normal
customers. The average inter-annotator agreement was 0.79
based on Cohen’s κ.
D. Interesting Observations
• Customers of the blackmarket services often remove their
tweets after a small duration. We found that around 3%
customers have removed their tweets.
• We also found 1% customers who are suspended by Twit-
ter. This clearly indicates that Twitter is still inefficient
in identifying customers of the blackmarket services.
• We found 31 customers who are marked as verified
genuine accounts by Twitter. This also indicates the
inability of current Twitter policy to flag blackmarket
customers.
• The Twitter profiles of 4% customers are shown with
the warning “Caution: This account is temporarily re-
stricted”. Twitter enforces this warning on users in re-
gards to either of the following cases : (i) repeatedly post-
ing duplicate or near-duplicate content, (ii) abusing trend-
ing topics or hashtags, (iii) sending automated tweets
or replies, and (iv) using bots or applications to post
similar messages based on keywords. , (v) posting similar
messages over multiple accounts, and (vi) aggressively
following and un-following people.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we present novel features to characterize
different types of users (both customers and genuine users)
and supervised models for classifying users.
A. Feature Selection
We use an extensive set of 64 novel features to detect
different types of users. We group these features into five
buckets: (i) Profile Features (PF), (ii) Social Network Features
(SNF), (iii) User Activity Features (UAF), (iv) Likelihood
Features (LF), and (v) Fluctuation Features (FF).
(i) Profile Features (PF): We hypothesize that the older
the account of a user, s/he will have more tendency to
retweet others’ tweets. Therefore, we take account age
(PF1) as one feature in our study. Figure 2 corroborates
our hypothesis by showing that both genuine users and
customers exhibit an increasing trend of retweet count
w.r.t their account age. We further consider four other
profile features: (PF2) length of the screen name, (PF3)
whether the profile has a description or not, (PF4) length
of profile description, (PF5) whether profile has a URL or not.
3https://maximizesocialbusiness.com/why-your-twitter-account-may-be-
restricted-1169/
Fig. 2: Relationship between retweet count and account age
(in days; further divided into bins: bin 1: 0-499, bin 2: 500-
999,· · · , bin 8: 3500-3999).
(ii) Social Network Features (SNF): Social network features
such as number of followees (SNF1) and followers (SNF2) and
their ratio (SNF3) sometimes provide indicative information
about the users. Figure 3(a) shows that customers tend to
follow a lot of other users, compared to the genuine users –
this may be explained by the typical tendency of customers to
follow others with the intention that the followees will further
draw attention to their profiles as well as their tweets. Figure
3(a:inset) shows that followee count has a more positive
correlation (Spearman’s ρ = 0.58) with retweet count in case
of genuine user than the customers (Spearman’s ρ = 0.42).
Figure 3(b) shows that genuine users tend to have a variety of
follower count, whereas all customers have a smaller follower
count. Figure 3 (b:inset) shows that genuine users with a
large number of followers tend to retweet more compared to
those with less followers; however, it may not hold for the
customers. The ratio of followees to followers in Figure 3(c)
shows that genuine users have a lower followee to follower
ratio – this is expected as they tend to have around equal
number of followees and followers (recall that we excluded
celebrities from our study, whose follower count may be
much higher than the followee count). For genuine users,
we also observe a declining trend of retweet count with the
increase of followee to follower ratio; however customers do
not follow any such trend (Figure 3 (c:inset)). We further
measure the influence score of users using Klout score4
(SNF4) and take it as a feature. Klout score returns a value
between 1-100 to rate a user based on his/her online social
influence. The Klout score of genuine users and customers
based on their influence is shown in Figure 3(d). The median
value of Klout score for customers and genuine users is 48.11
and 43.57 respectively – such small difference in Klout score
indicates that though customers use blackmarket services,
it does not help them making their profile significantly
popular. Fig. 3 (d:inset) shows that the retweet count tends
to increase with the increase of Klout score for genuine
users; however there is not such uniform pattern for customers.
4http://klout.com
Fig. 3: CDF of social network features – (a) followee count,
(b) follower count, (c) followee to follower ratio, (d) Klout
score, and their relation with the retweet count (inset). The
variable in x-axis is same for the main diagram and its inset.
(iii) User Activity Features (UAF): User activity plays a
significant role - higher the activity of a user, higher is the
chance of his/her tweet to be retweeted by a stranger. We
use the following features to measure the activity of users:
(UAF1) total number of tweets, (UAF2) number of direct
mentions per tweet, (UAF3) number of URLs per tweet,
(UAF4) number of hashtags per tweet, (UAF5) number of
tweets per day, (UAF6) number of retweets per day, and
(UAF7) number of retweets per tweet. To compute these
features, we crawl all (max 3200) tweets from the timeline of
each user. We also use Bot-score (UAF8) of each user from
Botometer service5 [5] and consider it as a feature.
(iv) Likelihood Features (LF): If Twitter users want to
publish tweets in a credit-based blackmarket service, they
need to retweet a lot of others’ tweets to earn credits for
their own tweets to be retweeted by other customers. On
the contrary, when they write tweets on Twitter and do
not submit these tweets to any blackmarket services, they
are not expected to perform such credit-based retweeting
activity. We use the following set of features to capture this
phenomenon: (LF1-7) tweeting likelihood per day for seven
days (Monday-Sunday), (LF8-14) retweeting likelihood per day
for seven days, (LF15-21) regularity of tweeting activity per
day for seven days, (LF22-28) regularity of retweeting activity
per day for seven days, (LF29) tweet steadiness, (LF30)
retweet steadiness, (LF31-37) maximum tweet likelihood per
day for seven days, and (LF38-44) maximum retweet likelihood
per day for seven days. LF1-7 (resp. LF8-14) is calculated
by taking the ratio of the tweets (resp. retweets) of a user
per day to the total number of tweets (resp. retweets) the
user posted in a week. Regularity of tweeting activity per
5https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
day (LF15-21) is calculated by −
∑24
i=1
p(xi) log p(xi), where
p(xi) is the fraction of tweets posted by the user at ith
hour of that day. We follow the same method to measure
LF22-28 by replacing tweets with retweets. Tweet (resp.
retweet) steadiness is calculated by 1/σt (resp. 1/σrt) where
σt (resp. σrt) is the standard deviation of time difference
between consecutive user-generated tweets (resp. retweets).
LF31-37 (resp. LF38-44) is calculated by the ratio of per-day
tweet (resp. retweet) count of a user to the maximum number
of tweets or (resp. retweets) the user posted in a day of a week.
(v) Fluctuation Features (FF): Customers of credit-based
blackmarket services want to acquire as many credits as
possible in order to gain more retweets to their own tweets. We
use the following features to validate this phenomenon: (FF1)
standard deviation of retweet counts for all user-generated
tweets, (FF2) mean of log-time difference between consecu-
tive retweets, (FF3) standard deviation of log-time difference
between consecutive retweets.
Note that unlike [3], we did not use any graph-related fea-
tures for two reasons: (i) crawling the complete neighborhood
structure of users requires huge computational resources and
sometimes produces incomplete information due to several
constraints such as restriction of API and user profiles, (ii)
given an unknown user account, collecting its neighborhood
structure is time-consuming, which in turn may affect scala-
bility of the real-time system we intended to build (Section
VI). However, we do not claim that graph-based features will
not enhance the classification performance.
B. Classification Models
We consider six state-of-the-art stand-alone supervised clas-
sifiers – Decision Tree (DT), K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN),
Logistic Regression (LR), Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector
Machine (SVM). We also consider three ensemble classifiers:
Random Forest (RF), Bagging (BG) and Boosting (BO). We
perform hyper-parameter optimization in order to find the
parameters that generate the best results. For instance, we use
CART with Gini gain criteria for DT; K-NN method with K =
5; multinomial logistic regression and SVM with linear kernel.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we start by briefly describing four baselines,
followed by the detailed experimental results.
A. Baseline Methods
Since there is no prior work on collusive retweeter detection,
we choose four state-of-the-art methods as baselines, which
are close to the problem we want to solve here.
Baseline I: BotoM: We use the social bot detection method
proposed by [5] and measure bot score for each retweeter. This
score is further used as a feature to run different supervised
classifiers mentioned in Section IV-B.
Baseline II: SpamBot: We use the method proposed by [22]
as our second baseline. It leverages a set of content-based and
network-based features to detect spam bots from a collection
TABLE III: Performance of different competing methods for multi-class classification.
Classifier Micro MacroPrecision Recall F1 ROC-AUC Precision Recall F1 AUC
BotoM (RF) 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.853 0.497 0.596 0.540 0.780
SpamBot 0.565 0.565 0.565 0.658 0.321 0.308 0.287 0.576
FakeAcc (LR) 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.809 0.358 0.383 0.347 0.727
NDSync (LR) 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.764 0.383 0.293 0.269 0.545
Decision Tree 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.706 0.636 0.596 0.587 0.712
K-NN 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.862 0.666 0.519 0.544 0.779
Logistic Regression 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.924 0.731 0.641 0.671 0.909
Naive Bayes 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.712 0.129 0.250 0.170 0.724
SVM 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.918 0.592 0.558 0.557 0.896
Random Forest 0.668 0.668 0.668 0.863 0.658 0.637 0.639 0.833
Bagging 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.904 0.689 0.707 0.691 0.884
Boosting 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.892 0.666 0.519 0.544 0.869
TABLE IV: Performance of different competing methods for binary classification.
Classifier Micro MacroPrecision Recall F1 ROC-AUC Precision Recall F1 AUC
BotoM (DT) 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760 0.760
SpamBot 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.660 0.727 0.665 0.646 0.660
FakeAcc (SVM) 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.701 0.704 0.701 0.693 0.701
NDSync 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.573 0.576 0.573 0.573 0.573
Decision Tree 0.859 0.859 0.859 0.633 0.640 0.632 0.622 0.632
K-NN 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.795 0.814 0.795 0.795 0.795
Logistic Regression 0.859 0.859 0.859 0.795 0.860 0.858 0.858 0.795
Naive Bayes 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.500 0.259 0.500 0.341 0.500
SVM 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.873 0.873 0.873
Random Forest 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.786 0.797 0.785 0.780 0.786
Bagging 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.698 0.709 0.698 0.684 0.698
Boosting 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.873 0.814 0.795 0.795 0.873
of Twitter users. It assumes that a genuine user is less likely
to post duplicate tweets as compared to a bot. To compare
our method with this baseline, we use their proposed set of
features and their suggested classifier (Naive Bayes) to classify
retweeters as ‘Genuine’, ‘Bots’, ‘Promotional’ and ‘Normal’.
Baseline III: FakeAcc: [8] proposed a fake account detection
model in Twitter based on minimum weighted feature set. It
first measures gain ratio of 22 features and considers those
features whose ratio crosses a certain threshold. Several clas-
sifiers are used, among which LR and SVM turned out to be
the best for multi-class and binary classification respectively.
Baseline IV: NDSync: The closest baseline of our method is
NDSync [10] which identifies multiple synchronous patterns
across spam retweet threads. It extracts a set of features related
to retweet threads (such as number of retweets, lifespan,
response time etc.), projects retweet threads into a multi-
dimensional feature space, and segments the feature space.
It then estimates the suspiciousness score of each thread, and
combines these scores for all the retweet threads associated
with a user to obtain a user-level score. NDSync is an unsu-
pervised method to classify retweeters as ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’.
We use this method for binary classification. However, for
multi-class classification, we utilize the suspicious user score
returned by NDSync as a feature for supervised classifiers.
B. Evaluation Setup
We combine the customers collected from blackmarket
services (see Table II), yielding 743 customers (comprising
of 86 bots, 275 promotional and 382 normal customers). We
also sample 743 users randomly from a set of 1000 genuine
users we collected, which makes the two classes balanced.
The accuracy of each competing method is measured using
the following metrics: Precision, Recall, F1-score, and Area
under the ROC curve (AUC). Since multi-class classification
in involved, we report all these metrics in both Micro and
Macro settings (e.g., Micro-Precision, Macro-Precision etc.).
We report the accuracy after averaging the result of 10-fold
cross validation.
C. Results of Multi-class Classification
We design the first experimental setup as a four-class
classification problem (genuine, bot, promotional, normal).
Table III shows the results for the four-class classification. We
obtain the best result of BotoM with Random Forest. Among
four baselines, BotoM performs the best across all evaluation
metrics. However, with our feature set, Logistic Regression
achieves the maximum accuracy – it achieves 18% and 8.3%
higher Micro-F1 and Micro AUC respectively, and 24.25%
and 15.38% higher Macro-F1 and Macro AUC respectively
w.r.t to the best baseline. The class-wise F1-score of Logistic
Regression is as follows: 0.89 (genuine), 0.80 (bot), 0.58
(promotional), and 0.68 (normal).
D. Results of Binary Classification
One may only be interested to identify whether a retweeter
is a customer or a genuine users, instead of a fine-grained
classification of customers. Therefore, we conduct another set
of experiments by combining all types of customers into a
single class, and consider the problem as a binary classification
problem. In Table IV, we notice that BotoM with Decision
Fig. 4: Feature importance (accuracy of SVM for binary classification considering each feature in isolation). We also plot the
accuracy with all features at the right-most bar of the figure (labeled as ‘All’).
Tree turns out to be the best baseline. However, this time
SVM turns out to be the best model with a score of 0.873
for all metrics, which is followed by Logistic Regression.
SVM beats the best baseline by 11.3% and 11.3% in terms
of Micro-F1 and Micro AUC respectively, and by 10.3% and
11.3% in terms of Macro-F1 and Macro AUC respectively.
The class-wise F1-score of Logistic Regression is as follows:
0.87 (genuine), 0.88 (customer).
E. Feature Importance
Figure 4 shows the importance of 64 features. Here we take
each feature in isolation and run the best binary-classification
model (SVM)6. The most important feature seems to be Bot-
score (UAF8) with which SVM achieves a Macro F1-score of
0.75. It also corroborates with the significantly high accuracy
of our first baseline model (BotoM). The second and third
ranked features are – maximum retweet likelihood in every
Tuesday (LF39) and in every Friday (LF42) respectively. One
possible reason why LF39 and LF42 have better discriminatory
power is that these blackmarket services refresh their tweet
database every 3-4 days (possibly every Tuesday and Friday).
Thus, in order to keep their credit high, customers must
keep on retweeting tweets every 3-4 days. However, as a
whole, fluctuation features turn out to be the best (Macro
F1=0.61), followed by user activity feature (Macro F1=0.554)
and likelihood feature (Macro F1=0.55).
VI. BROWSER EXTENSION: SCORE
In the previous section, we have showed that state-of-the-
art supervised models are capable of producing a significant
accuracy with our proposed feature set to segregate blackmar-
ket customers from genuine users. In order to help users deal
with such fake retweeting activities, we attempt to build an
extension, named SCoRe for chrome browser. It allows users
to spot the blackmarket customers, which in turn provides a
better way to understand the importance of a tweet.
Figure 5 shows a snapshot of how SCoRe facilitates users.
The input is a link of the tweet whose retweeters the user
wants to analyze. It first extracts all its retweeters, calculates
the features for each retweeter, and then feeds it to the pre-
trained SVM. Finally, the label (Genuine or Customer) of each
6The pattern of feature importance is same for the multi-class classification
with Logistic Regression.
Fig. 5: Browser extension: SCoRe.
retweeter is displayed. It also allows users to provide feedback
on each label. There is a ‘thumbs down’ symbol associated
with each label, upon clicking of which the feedback will be
forwarded to the back-end server. SCoRe has the capability
to be trained incrementally with the feedback provided by the
users. However, special care has been taken to make the learn-
ing process robust by ignoring spurious feedback. An attacker
may want to pollute SCoRe by injecting wrong feedback.
SCoRe handles these spurious feedback by first checking the
confidence of the current model on labels associated with the
feedback, and ignoring them if the confidence is more than
a pre-selected threshold (currently set as 0.75). This makes
SCoRe more robust under adversarial attacks.
User study: To analyse the performance of SCoRe, we
conducted a user study with the help of 25 volunteers. First,
we randomly assigned 20 tweet URLs to each volunteer.
Volunteers visited each URL with the extension activated in
their browser, clicked on the retweeter list (each retweeter was
labeled as ‘Genuine’ or ‘Customer’ by SCoRe) and marked the
wrong label by pressing ‘thumbs down’ button. SCoRe took
10 sec to label each retweeter. We recorded the responses of
Fig. 6: Alluvial diagram representing the flows of tweets
between the bins (based on retweet count) before and
after filtering customers. The colored blocks correspond to
different bins (the range of retweet count is divided equally
into five bins). Left (right) blocks correspond to bins based on
retweet rank before (after) the filtering. The size of the block
indicates the number of tweets in that bin, and the shaded
waves joining the regions represent flow of tweets between
the bins, such that the width of the flow corresponds to the
fraction of tweets.
the volunteers and measured the average accuracy. The results
shows that SCoRe is highly accurate, achieving an average
accuracy) of 85% (with standard deviation of 0.02).
VII. IMPLICATION OF COLLUSIVE RETWEEER DETECTION
Once we detect collusive retweeters, its immediate impli-
cation would be to re-rank the tweets based on modified
retweet count (after filtering blackmarket customers). Figure 6
shows an alluvial diagram, indicating how tweets (500 tweets
collected from the customers’ timelines) change their ranking
after such filtering. We show that top- and middle-ranked
tweets are mostly affected by this filtering. We believe that
this analysis opens the scope for a serious re-investigation of
the existing metrics for ranking tweets/users.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of understanding and
detecting blackmarket-based collusive retweeters. The major
contributions of this work are fourfold: Dataset: We collected
a dataset of blackmarket collusive retweeters and annotated
them. This, to our knowledge, is the first dataset of such kind.
Characterization: We propose 64 novel features to charac-
terize customers and differentiate them from normal users.
Classification: State-of-the-art supervised methods performed
significantly well to classify customers and genuine retweeters.
System design: We developed SCoRe, a chrome extension that
spots blackmarket retweeters in real-time.
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